Abstract. Parallel repetition is well known to reduce the error probability at an exponential rate for single-and multi-prover interactive proofs.
Introduction
Interactive Proofs. In a (single prover) interactive proof a prover P tries to convince a computationally bounded verifier V that their common input x is in a language L. The soundness of such a protocol is an upper bound on the error probability of V , i.e. the probability that V accepts P 's claim, even though x ∈ L. In order to lower the error probability one can repeat the interactive proof k times, where V accepts the claim if it accepts in all k runs. The protocol can be repeated either sequentially, here V and P start the ith run of the protocol only after finishing the (i − 1)th, or in parallel. Although the computational and communication complexity of parallel and sequential repetition is the same, parallel repetition has the big advantage of not increasing the round complexity. For single prover interactive proofs, sequential and parallel repetition reduce the error at an exponential rate: if a protocol with soundness is repeated k times sequentially or in parallel, the error probability drops to k . In general, parallel repetition is more problematic than sequential repetition. For example: parallel repetition does not preserve the zero-knowledge property of a protocol [8] , and there are two-prover proofs where running the proof twice in parallel does not decrease the error at all [6] . On the positive side, Raz [12] shows that k-fold parallel repetition of a two-prover two-round proof system with soundness does decrease the error to αk where α > 0 is some constant depending only on the proof system.
Computational Soundness. Interactive arguments are defined like interactive proofs, but where the soundness of the protocol only holds against computationally bounded provers. Damgård and Pfitzmann [4] show that sequential repetition lowers the error probability of arguments at an exponential rate.
Bellare et al. [2] show that parallel repetition reduces the error of computationally sound protocols with three rounds or less at an exponential rate. On the negative side, they give, for any k, a four round protocol where k-fold parallel repetition does not decrease the error at all. The communication complexity of this protocol is linear in k, which leaves open the possibility that parallel repetition does reduce the error if the communication complexity is not allowed to depend on the number of repetitions. This is a possibility one should consider, as the before-mentioned constant α in Raz's theorem is inverse in the communication complexity of the protocol, and this dependence is necessary [7] . So for protocols where the communication complexity grows linearly in k, parallel repetition does not imply error reduction at all for two-prover two-round proofs. Observing that the four-round protocol of Bellare et al. can be restated as a two-round two-prover protocol (without loosing the property that parallel repetition does not decrease the error), makes the possibility that unbounded communication complexity is necessary here even more likely.
Noticing this possibility, Bellare et al. propose another four-round protocol with fixed communication complexity, which has the property that relative to an oracle repeating the protocol any polynomial number of times in parallel, does not decrease the error. This shows that there is no "black-box" error reduction theorem for this protocol. Bellare et al. see this result as evidence that parallel repetition does not decrease the error of computationally sound protocols. Another interpretation of this result could be that parallel repetition does always reduce the error, and the reason why there's no proof of this is that such a proof would require non black-box techniques. We show that under standard assumptions the interpretation of Bellare et al. is indeed correct for protocols with eight rounds or more, and we give much stronger evidence that this is also true for protocols with four rounds. The Verifier's Secret. Except for Section 3, throughout we consider protocols where the verifier holds no secret and thus its strategy is efficiently computable. The reason is that otherwise there are trivial protocols where parallel repetition does not decrease the error as observed by Bellare et al. [2] , we extend their observation in Section 3.
Our Contribution
For n a security parameter, we present the first computationally sound protocol where k(n)-fold parallel repetition does not decrease the error for any polynomial k(·). To achieve this we start with the protocol of Bellare et al. whose k-fold parallel repetition does not decrease the error, but we modify it such that k is chosen by the prover (in particular, if the prover has to run the protocol k(n) times in parallel, he can set k = k(n)). As in this protocol the the length of the second message from the prover to the verifier is linear in k, we must allow a verifier V super which runs in super-polynomial time, in order for the protocol to work for any polynomial k(·). We then transform this protocol into one with a fixed polynomial time verifier V poly using the universal arguments due to Barak and Goldreich [1] . Loosely speaking, the long message is replaced by a hash value, which then is followed by an interactive proof to V poly which shows that V super would have accepted the message. We get the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
There exists an overwhelmingly complete eight round protocol with error probability 3/4 such that k(·)-fold parallel repetition does not reduce its error probability below 1/17 for any polynomially bounded k(·), under the assumption that collision-free family of hash functions and CCA2-secure cryptosystem with respect to superpolynomial adversaries exists.
Unfortunately, the use of an universal argument increases the round complexity of the protocol from the optimal four to eight.
In Section 5 we propose a new four round protocol relative to an oracle, where k(n)-fold parallel repetition does not decrease the error for any polynomial k(·). Unlike the artificial oracle used by Bellare et al., we only need a generic group which potentially can be instantiated with a concrete group satisfying some clearly defined hardness assumptions (basically, it must be hard to compute the inverse of a random element).
More precisely, let p ∈ [2 n , 2 n+1 ] be a randomly chosen prime, let φ : Z p → [0, 2K − 1] be a randomly chosen injection and φ(x) def = φ (x mod p) its natural extension to the whole of Z. Then denote by O the oracle defined by
and ⊥ otherwise. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
There exists an overwhelmingly complete four round protocol relative the oracle O with error probability 1/2 + negl(n) such that k(·)-fold parallel repetition does not reduce its error probability below 1/2 + negl(n) for any polynomially bounded k(·).
Preliminaries

Notation
We use Z to denote the integers and Z p to denote the integers modulo p. We use log to denote the logarithm in base two. We denote by TM the set of Turing machines. We denote by PT and PT * the set of uniform and non-uniform polynomial time Turing machines respectively. The corresponding sets of oracle machines are denoted by adding a superscript, e.g. PT O . We use n to denote the security parameter, and say that a function (n) is negligible if for every constant c there exists a constant n 0 such that (n) < n −c for n > n 0 . We use negl(n) to denote a fixed but unspecified non-negative negligible function. A function f (n) is overwhelming if 1 − f (n) is negligible. If ν : N → N is a function we denote by PT * ν the set of non-uniform Turing machines that executes in time ν(n)p(n) for some polynomial p. We say that ν is polynomial-time computable if there exists a Turing machine M ν that on input x ∈ {0, 1} n outputs ν(x) using at most p(n) steps, for some polynomial p.
We say that a family of hash functions is PT * ν -collision-free if it is collisionfree with respect to adversaries in PT * ν . Similarly, we say that a cryptosystem is PT * ν -CCA2-secure, if it is CCA2-secure with respect to adversaries in PT * ν . We denote by V (x), P (y) (z) the output of V on private input x and common input z after interacting with P on private input y and common input z. We denote by kV the sequential repetition of k copies of V and we denote by V k the parallel repetition of k copies of V . In both cases identical private and common inputs are given to each instance and the combined verifier accepts if and only if all instances accept.
Computationally Sound Protocols
We consider the setting introduced in [2] . Two parties, a prover P and a verifier V , are communicating. They are both given an initial context λ ∈ {0, 1} * and the length of this string serves as the security parameter. The initial context could be the output of another protocol or some string in a set-up assumption. Since we do not mention λ explicitly below, we replace it by the security parameter in unary representation 1 n , but our results hold in the more general setting.
Both parties are also given a common input x which is generated together with some secret information w by a probabilistic polynomial time instance generator I that is given input 1 n . The secret information w is given to P at the start of the protocol.
Universal Arguments
Barak and Goldreich [1] introduce the notion of universal arguments as a special variant of Micali's computationally sound proofs [9] . They define the relation R U as the set of pairs ((M, x, t), w) such that the Turing machine M outputs 1 on input (x, w) within t steps. Denote by T M (x, w) the number of steps made by M on input (x, w). A key property of their definition is that t is given in binary. We are mainly interested in two properties of universal arguments: (1) the complexity of the verifier depends only on the size of the common input and not on the size of the witness, and (2) the witness used by the prover can be extracted in a weak sense. The actual definition given by Barak and Goldreich [1] is duplicated below.
Definition 1 (Universal Argument).
A universal-argument system is a pair of strategies, denoted (P, V ) that satisfies the following properties:
Efficient verification. There exists a polynomial p such that for any y = (M, x, t), the total time spent by the probabilistic verifier strategy V , on common input y, is at most p(|y|). (In particular, all messages exchanged in the protocol have length smaller than p(|y|).) 2. Completeness by a relatively efficient prover. For every ((M, x, t), w)
in 
there exists a polynomial p such that the total time spent by P (w) on common input (M, x, t) is at most p(T M (x, w)) ≤ p(t).
Computational soundness. For every polynomial-size circuit family
.
Theorem 3 ([1]). If there exists a family of collision-free hash functions, then there exists universal arguments with 4 rounds.
When the Verifier Holds a Secret
In this section we show that parallel repetition does not decrease the error probability of computationally sound protocols when the verifier gets any private information. Bellare et al. [2] give the following simple example of such a protocol: The common input is an RSA modulus N = pq and the secret of the verifier is the factors p and q. The verifier flips a coin. If it is heads it gives the factors to the prover and otherwise not. It accepts if the prover's reply is (p, q). An even simpler example is the following one-round protocol: The verifier has a secret bit b, and accepts if the message from the prover is b.
Clearly, parallel repetition does not decrease the error probability for the two protocols above (in fact, for the first protocol it increases), but neither does sequential repetition. This leaves open the interesting possibility that parallel repetition does always decrease the error probability of computationally sound protocols where the verifier can hold a secret, for all protocols where sequential repetition does reduce the error. Below we show that this is not the case by giving a natural (four-round) protocol that when repeated sequentially lowers the error probability, but if repeated in parallel gives error probability essentially one. Here CS = (Kg, Enc, Dec) denotes a public key cryptosystem. The next two propositions are proved in Appendix A for completeness.
Proposition 1 (Single Instance). The protocol is overwhelmingly complete and has 4 rounds. If the cryptosystem CS is CCA2-secure, then for every prover
P * ∈ PT * : Pr (pk ,sk ),s [ V s (sk , pk ), P * (pk ) = 1] < 1 2 + negl(n).
Proposition 2 (Sequential Repetition). If the cryptosystem CS is CCA2-secure, then for every polynomially bounded k(·) and every prover
P * ∈ PT * : Pr (pk ,sk ),s [ kV s (sk , pk ), P * (pk ) = 1] < ( 1 2 ) k + negl(n).
Proposition 3 (Parallel Repetition). For every polynomially bounded k(·)
there exists a prover
Proof. The prover P * does the following. It waits for B i from V i . Then it defines C i = B i+1 mod k and hands it to V i . With overwhelming probability
with overwhelming probability b i = b i , each V i accepts, and V k accepts with overwhelming probability as well, since k is polynomial.
When the Verifier Holds No Secret
From now on we consider computationally sound protocols where the verifier holds no secret. In this section we give an eight-round computationally sound protocol where parallel repetition does not decrease the error.
The Example of Bellare et al. Before we give our counter example we recall the counter example given by Bellare et al. [2] on which our example is based. The idea of the protocol is to explicitly allow the prover to make several instances of it dependent if run in parallel.
Protocol 2 (Don't Do In k-Parallel, [2])
Common input: Public key pk . Private input to prover: Private key sk .
V chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and r ∈ {0, 1}
n randomly, computes B = Enc pk (b, r), and sends B to P .
We have modified the protocol slightly to be more consistent with our counter example below. In the original the test is b = k−1 i=1 b i and this is needed if given a ciphertext the cryptosystem allows construction of a new ciphertext of an identical plaintext. If we require that the cryptosystem used in the protocol is CCA2-secure this is not an issue.
Intuitively, if a single instance of the protocol is run, then a prover without access to sk can only convince the honest verifier with probability 1/2, since it must commit itself to a guess k−1 i=1 b i of b before receiving (b, r) and the cryptosystem is non-malleable (recall that CCA2-security implies non-malleability). On the other hand, if k instances of the protocol are run in parallel, then the prover can send the tuple (
and then either all verifier instances accept or all verifier instances fail, the first event occurring with probability at least 1/2. If there are fewer than k instances the remaining C i 's can be defined as ciphertexts of zero.
Why the Example is Unsatisfactory. The example requires that the complexity of the verifier in each instance grows linearly with the number of instances. In other words, the example does not imply that k -parallel repetition of the protocol for k > k does not lower the error probability.
This deficiency motivated Bellare et al. [2] to consider if there exists any analytical method, i.e, an error-reduction procedure, whereby one can show that the error probability is lowered by the parallel repetition of a protocol. They prove that there exists no such black-box error-reduction procedure. Although we agree that this result is a strong indication that there exists no error-reduction procedure at all, it does not preclude the possibility of a non-black-box errorreduction procedure.
Our Counter Example
The idea of our counter example is to reduce the complexity of the verifier by making the long messages submitted by the prover in Bellare et al's protocol implicit. More precisely, we let the prover choose k on the fly, and hand a hash value of the list of ciphertext (C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ) instead of sending them explicitly. It also sends a hash value of (b 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (b k−1 , r k−1 ) instead of sending them explicitly. The problem with this is of course that now the verifier can not perform the original verification. To solve this problem without increasing the complexity of any instance of the verifier the prover proves using universal arguments [1] that it knows correct preimages of the hash values. For technical reasons we replace addition modulo 2 by addition modulo 17. The reader may think of 17 as some constant to be defined in the proof such that the theorem holds.
We assume that there exists a cryptosystem that is chosen ciphertext secure in the sense of Rackoff and Simon [11] against adversaries in PT * ν where ν(·) is a polynomially computable superpolynomial function (the reader can think of ν(n) as n log n ). It should be possible to construct such a scheme from any family of trap-door permutations secure against adversaries in PT * ν following Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [5] or Sahai [13] , but we are not aware of any explicit proof of this. We also assume the existence of a family of hash functions that is collision-free against adversaries in PT H, h, b, a, k), ((b 1 , r 1 ((b 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , (b k−1 , r k−1 )), and
Denote by M R h a canonical Turing machine that decides R h in polynomial time in n and k and correspondingly for M Ra .
Protocol 3 (Don't Do In Parallel)
Common input: Public key pk and collision-free hash function H. Private input to prover: Private key sk .
V chooses b ∈ Z 17 and r ∈ {0, 1}
P computes b = Dec sk (B). Then it chooses r ∈ {0, 1}
n randomly, computes C = Enc pk (b , r ) and h = H(C), and hands (h, k, t h ) to V , where k = 1 and H, h, k), C) . , H, h, b, a, k), (b , r ) ) and hands (a, t a ) to V .
If k > ν(n) or t h > ν(n), then V outputs 0. Otherwise P and V execute a universal argument on common input y h = (M R h , (B, H, h, k), t h ) and private input w h = C to the prover. 4. If V accepts the universal argument, then it hands (b, r) to P . Otherwise it outputs 0. 5. P computes a = H(b , r ) and t a = T MR a ((pk
If t a > ν(n), then V outputs 0. Otherwise P and V execute a universal argument on common input y a = (M Ra , (pk , H, h, b, a, k), t a ) and private input w a = (b , r ).
If V accepts the universal argument it outputs 1 and otherwise 0.
We stress that k, t h , and t a are encoded in binary. Thus, even though the adversary can choose t h and t a larger than any polynomial (as they only have to be smaller than the superpolynomial ν(n)), the complexity of the verifier can still be bounded by some fixed polynomial in n as it is polynomial only in n and log(ν(n)). This means that also k can be larger than any polynomial. This freedom is needed since we do not want to put any fixed polynomial bound on the "width" of the parallel repetition. On the other hand this is what forces us to consider superpolynomial adversaries. The problem is that when reducing soundness of the protocol to breaking the cryptosystem or the collision-freeness of the hash function we need to extract the ciphertexts C 1 , . . . , C k−1 , but we can not guarantee that a polynomial time adversary can not use implicit such values, which could give a superpolynomial witness during extraction.
Proposition 4 (Single Instance). The protocol is overwhelmingly complete and has 8 rounds. Let ν : N → N be a fixed superpolynomial and polynomial-time computable function, let the hash function be PT *
ν -collision-free, and let CS be PT * ν -CCA2-secure. Then for every prover P * ∈ PT * ν for all sufficiently large n:
. The relation between the constants 3/4 and 17 is essentially that in the reduction we need to "split" the success probability of the adversary twice, giving a factor 1/8, and we need to extract, giving a factor (3/4) 2 . Thus, the resulting adversary has success probability at least 1/16, which is bigger than 1/17.
Before we prove the above theorem we show that its error probability does not decrease if repeated in parallel. We stress that each instance V i of the verifier V k has the same complexity both in terms of computation and communication independently of k.
Proposition 5 (Parallel Repetition). For every polynomially bounded k(·) there is a prover
Proof. We define the prover P * interacting with V k , i.e., the parallel repetition of k instances of V , as follows. Given the cryptotexts B i from all V i it defines (C i,1 , . . . , C i,k−1 ) = (B 1 , . . . , B i−1 , B i+1 . . . , B k ) . Then it executes the first universal argument honestly. When it gets (b i , r i ) from V i it defines ((b i,1 , r i,1 ) , . . . , 
Proof (Proposition 4).
Completeness follows by inspection. Although the naive implementation of the protocol has more than eight rounds, it is easy to see that one can combine the rounds of the universal argument with the main protocol and achieve eight rounds. Suppose there exists a prover P * ∈ PT * ν with Pr (pk ,sk ),s [ V s (pk ), P * (pk ) 
We want to show that the CCA2-security of CS is broken by A, since this contradicts the security of CS. To do that we must argue that extraction succeeds from the first universal argument, but this is not sufficient. The problem is that it is conceivable that the adversary uses one set of ciphertext as a preimage of h in the first universal argument and another set in the second. Intuitively, the collisionfreeness of the hash function prohibits this, but we must prove that this is so.
Divide the randomness s used by the verifier into three parts: s B is used to form B, s h is used in the first universal argument, and s a is used in the second universal argument. Denote by S good the set of tuples (H, pk , sk , s B ) such that (H, pk , sk , s B ) .
An averaging argument implies Pr
[(H, pk , sk , s B ) ∈ S good ] ≥ δ/2. Note that the common input y h = (M R h , (B, H, h, k), t h ) is defined by
Claim 1. For every f > 0 there is a polynomial g h (n) such that the probability that A fails to extract w
Proof. From the weak proof of knowledge property of a universal argument follows that there exists a positive polynomial p (·) such that
for common inputs y h induced by (H, pk , sk , s B ) ∈ S good . Thus, for such common inputs the expected number of repetitions needed to extract a witness is bounded by p (|y h |). If we define g h (n) = (2 f /δ)p (|y h |) it follows from Markov's inequality that extraction fails with probability bounded by δ2
−f for such inputs.
We conclude from the union bound that the probability that (H, pk , sk , s B ) ∈ S good and A succeeds to extract w h such that (y h , w h ) ∈ R U is at least (1/2 − 2 −f )δ. Then we set c 1 = 1/2 − 2 −f and note that we by choosing f > 0 appropriately may set c 1 < 1/2 arbitrarily close to 1/2.
A Hypothetical Machine. Unfortunately, the above claim says nothing about the probability that the negative sum (modulo 17) of the plaintexts of the extracted C 1 , . . . , C k−1 equal the plaintext of B. Intuitively, the problem is that the prover could use one H-preimage of h in the first universal argument and another one in the second, but this should of course never happen due to the collision-freeness of H.
Denote by A C the machine that simulates A until C 1 , . . . , C k−1 are extracted from the first universal argument, or until it outputs 0. Then it chooses s a randomly and continues the simulation of the interaction of V and P * until P * hands (a, t a ) to V . Then it repeatedly, at most g a (n) times, invokes the extractors of the second universal argument with fresh randomness in the hope to extract w a = ((b 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , (b k−1 , r k−1 )) such that (y a , w a ) ∈ R U , and then outputs (w h , w a ). Otherwise it outputs 0.
Denote by S good the set of tuples (H, pk , sk , s B , s h ) such that (H, pk , sk , s B ) ∈ S good and Pr
An averaging argument implies that
Claim 2. For every f > 0 there is a polynomial g a (n) such that the probability that A C fails to extract w a such that (y a , w a ) ∈ R U on a common input y a induced by (H, pk , sk , s B , s h ) ∈ S good is bounded by δ2 −f .
Proof. This follows mutatis mutandi from the proof of the previous claim.
We conclude that the probability that A C succeeds to extract w a where
We define c 2 = 1/4 − 2 −f and note that we by choosing f > 0 appropriately can set 0 < c 2 < 1/4 arbitrarily close to 1/4. (w h , w a ) contains a collision for H, i.e.,  it satisfies (C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ) = (Enc pk (b 1 , r 1 
Claim 3. The probability that the output
Proof. If this was not the case we could define A C as the adversary that takes a description H of a hash function as input and simply simulates A C and outputs (C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ) and (Enc pk (b 1 , r 1 ), . . . , Enc pk (b k−1 , r k−1 ) ). It would break the collision-freeness of H with non-negligible probability.
Conclusion of Proof of Proposition.
From our claims follow that the probability that A C outputs (w h , w a ) such that
, where the constant 0 < c 3 < 1/8 may be chosen arbitrarily close to 1/8. This concludes the proof.
Parallel Repetition Relative to a Generic Group
In the previous section we gave -under standard assumptions -an eight-round protocol with constant communication complexity where parallel repetitions does not decrease the error. In this section we give such a protocol with optimal four rounds relative to a generic group oracle.
The Model
A generic group is a group where the group elements are encoded by random strings. Access to the encoding and the group operation are provided by a public oracle O. This model was put forward by Nechaev [10] and extended by Shoup [14] to prove lower bounds on the running time of the best generic algorithms to solve the discrete logarithm and related problems. An algorithm is called generic, if it does not use the representation of the group elements, for example the baby-step giant-step algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem is generic, but index-calculus is not. Damgård and Koprowski [3] extend this model to groups of unknown order, our model is very similar to theirs, the main difference is that our group oracle does not provide any efficient way to invert elements. For ease of notation we write N = 2 n . The distribution of the group oracle is defined as follows. A random prime p in the range N < p < 2N and a random injection φ : x mod p) denote the natural extension of φ to the whole of Z. To find the encoding of an element the oracle is called with a single argument, i.e., we define O(x) = φ(x). In addition to providing encodings, the oracle can be called with two arguments from φ(Z) to find their product, i.e, we define
and ⊥ otherwise. As mentioned above, unlike [3] our oracle does not provide the inverse operation φ(−x mod p) from φ(x), in fact, for our proof it is necessary that computing φ(−x mod p) given φ(x) is hard.
We will often have to sample a random element from the range of φ(Z), unfortunately we cannot efficiently sample a uniformly random one, as we do not know p. We thus use the following observation. 2 to construct such a predicate is to set τ (x) = 1 ⇐⇒ x > N. Due to the random choice of φ it is not hard to see that it has the required property with overwhelming probability over the choice of φ. Below we assume that Pr X∈φ(Z) [τ (X) = 1] = 1/2 to simplify the exposition.
Our Counter Example
We present a protocol which can be seen as an interactive proof that the prover P "knows" the group order p of the group oracle O. If P indeed knows p, he can make the verifier V accept with probability 1.
Protocol 4 (Don't Do In Parallel (Generic Group))
Common input: A predicate τ . Private input to prover: A predicate τ and a group order p.
O accepts if and only if φ(y − x) = Z and τ (φ(y)) = 1.
Note that if the prover computes the messages Z and y as shown in the protocol, then the verifier accepts. In Step 2 the prover can compute φ(−x mod p) = φ((p − 1)x) from X in polynomial time using his knowledge of p. Before we prove the proposition above we show that parallel repetition fails to reduce the error probability.
Proposition 6 (Single Instance
Proposition 7 (Parallel Repetition). For every polynomially bounded k(·)
there is a prover
, where the probability is taken over O, τ , and the internal randomness of V O .
Proof. The prover P O, * after receiving the messages
Note that Z i can be computed by repeated queries to O using only X 1 , . . . , X k . By construction we have φ(
is statistically close to uniform, and thus τ (φ(y 1 )) = 1 with probability at least 1/2 − negl(n). 
Proof (Proposition 6). Let
3 Denote by = (n) the polynomial number of oracle queries made by the prover. Without loss we assume that (a i , b i ) = (a j , b j ) for i = j, and that Z ∈ Q . The latter holds, since the probability that φ(y − x) = Z conditioned on Z ∈ Q is easily bounded by 1/(N − ). We now prove two claims from which the proposition follows.
Claim 4 (Hard to find multiple of p). For any algorithm M ∈ T M
O which makes at most m − 1 oracle queries, each of length at most m bits and where the output is of length at most m bits, we have
which is negligible for a polynomially bounded m).
Proof. Denote by P(N ) the set of primes in [N, 2N ] , by the prime number theorem |P(N )| = Θ(N/n).
The machine M can choose a sequence t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t m−1 of values in Z and ask the oracle for T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m−1 where T i = φ(t i ). Moreover we allow M an additional mth query which must be its output, i.e. v = t m . The ith oracle query can be either of the form T i = O(t i ) or T i = O(T j , T k ) for j, k < i (then t i = t j + t k ). We can upper bound the size of any t i as log(t i ) ≤ 2m as follows: if the ith query is of the form O(t i ) then log(t i ) ≤ m (as no query can be longer than m bits). If the query is of the form O(T j , T k ), then log(t i ) ≤ 1 + max{log(t j ), log(t k )}, so for any i ≤ m, log(t i ) ≤ m + i ≤ 2m.
Let t = m i=1 t i . Then we have log(t) ≤ m i=1 log(t i ) ≤ 2m 2 . So at most 2m 2 /n primes from P(N ) divide t, and thus also v = t m . The probability that p is one of those primes is at most (2m 2 /n)/|P(N )| = Θ(m 2 /N ).
The following claim is very similar to Theorem 1 in [14] . 
We clearly also have Pr[∧
Denote by A the adversary that accepts a public key pk and hands the pair of messages (0, 1) to the experiment, and waits for a challenge ciphertext B. Then it proceeds as follows:
